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Abst ract - - In  multiobjective programming, the concept of equitable fficiency strengthens the 
concept of Pareto efficiency by additionally requiring that the objective functions be anonymous and 
satisfy the principle of transfers. The preference relation satisfying these assumptions i  not related 
to a cone as is the Pareto preference. A complete preference structure of equitability is derived and 
an approach to generating equitably efficient solutions is proposed. @ 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights 
reserved. 
Keywords - -Equ i tab i l i ty ,  Pareto efficiency, Multiobjective programming, Preference structure. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, multiobjective programming (MOP) and multicriteria decision making (MCDM) 
have been based on the concept of Pareto efficiency (optimality). Yu [1] develops a convex- 
cone theory for modeling preferences in MOP and gives foundations for many successful research 
initiatives in MOP and MCDM. MOP has also been studied in the context of other principles uch 
as optimality based on the lexicographic ordering, max-ordering, and lexicographic max-ordering. 
Recent  surveys on the state-of-the-art in MOP and  MCDM the reader can find in [2]. 
Some researchers undertake efforts to generalize the convex-cone approach  of Yu. Bergstresser 
et el. [3] use a convex set rather than a convex cone to represent preferences. Takeda  and 
Nishida [4] introduce fuzzy dominat ion  structures for MOP while Hazen  and  Mor in  [5] study 
optimality conditions for MOP with a nonconical order. More  recently, We idner  [6,7] studies 
scalarization approaches to multiobjective programs with preferences mode led  by parameter-  
depend ing  sets while Chen and  Yang [8] relate a variable dominat ion  structure to a nonlinear 
scalarization for MOP.  
Mot ivated  by  the interest in equity issues, Kost reva and  Ogryczak  [9] introduce the concept 
of equitability into MOP.  Whi le  Pareto eflZiciency assumes  that the criteria are uncomparab le ,  
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equitability is based on the assumption that the criteria are not only comparable (measured on 
a common scale) but also anonymous (impartial). The latter makes the distribution of outcomes 
among the criteria more important than the assignment ofoutcomes to specific riteria, and there- 
fore models equitable allocation of resources. Kostreva and Ogryczak [9] and Kostreva et al. [10] 
develop scalarization approaches to generating equitable fficient solutions of linear and nonlinear 
multiobjective programs. Ogryczak demonstrates quitability on portfolio optimization [11] and 
location problems [12]. 
The intention is this paper is to study equitability within the framework developed by Yu. It is 
shown that the preference relation representing equitability is not derived from a unique cone as 
are other preferences (e.g., Pareto, lexicographic) but from a finite number of cones. In the next 
section, the concepts of interest are defined and important results from the literature reviewed. 
Preliminary results are presented in Section 3 while the description of the equitability preference 
structure is developed in Section 4. An approach to generating equitably efficient solutions is 
proposed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Throughout his article the following notation is used. Let R "~ be the Euclidean vector space 
and yl,y2 C R m. yl < y2 denotes y~ < y2 for all i -- 1 , . . . ,m.  y~ =< y2 denotes y~ _< y~ for all 
i = 1 , . . . ,m.  yl _< y2 denotes yl ~ y2 but yl ¢ y2. 
DEFINITION 1. Let yl,  y2 C R m a4ld let ~- be a relation of weak preference defined on ~'~ x R m. 
The corresponding relations of strict preference ~- and indifference ~ are defined as fo110ws: 
1. yl ~ y2 ¢v (yl ~_ y2 and not y2 ~_ yl). 
2. yl ~ y2 v=~ (yl _ y2 and y2 ~. yl). 
DEFINITION 2. Preference relations satisfying the following axioms are called equitable rational 
preference relations: 
1. Reflexivity: for all y C ]~m: y ~ y. 
2. Transitivity: for all yl y2,y3 E Rm: yl ~_ y2 and y2 ~_ ya ~ yl ~_ y3. 
3. Strict monotonicity: for all y ~ Rm: y -Ee i  ~ y for E > 0 where ei denotes the i th unit 
vector in R m. 
4. Impartiality: for all y E Rm: (Yl,Y2,... ,Ym) ~ (Y~0),Yr(2),"" ,Y~(m)) for any permuta- 
tion ~" of components of y. 
5. Principle of transfers: for all y E Rm: Yi > Yj ~ Y - zei + sej ~ y for 0 < z < Yi - Yj. 
DEFINITION 3. Let yl, y2 be in ]~m. We say that yl is equitably preferred to (equitably indifferent 
to, equitably dominated by) y2, yl >-e (~, -~e)Y  2 if yl ~_ (~, _~)y2 for all equitable rational 
preference re]ations ~-. 
Following [9], we define the ordering map O, the cumulative ordering map O, and review their 
properties. 
DEFINITION 4. Let y be in Rm. 
1. Let O:  R m - ' ->  R m be the ordering map defined as O(y) = (01(y), 02(y),. . . ,  Ore(y)), where 
el(y) >_ 02(y) _> " '  _> Om(y), Oi(y) = Y~(i) for i --- 1,2,. . .  ,m,  and ~- is a permutation of 
the set {1,. . . ,  m}. 
2. Let 0 : R "~ --* ~'~ be the cumulative ordering map defined as ~)(y) = (Ol(y),O2(y),..., 
where 0 (y) := 0j(y) for i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  m 
PROPOSITION 1. Let yl and y2 be in R m. Then 
1. O(y = e (y  iff = 
2. < O(U :) _< 
3. y~ ~¢ y2 iff O(y~) ~ ~(y2). 
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We refer to the space ~'~ as the outcome space. Following Yu [1], we partition this space into 
disjoint subsets of outcomes that are dominated by, preferred than, indifferent o, or undefined 
with respect o a given outcome ~3 ~ Rm. 
DEFINITION 5. Let fl 6 R m. The set of points 
1. equitably dominated by ~ is defined as D(~) := {y ~ R m : y -~ ~}; 
2. equitably preferred to ~ is defined as P(~) := {y ~ R'~ : y >-, ~); 
3. equitably indifferent o ~ is defined as I(~) := {y ~ R "~ : y ~ ~1}; 
4. equitably undefined with respect o 9 is defined as U(9 ) := ~'~ \ {V(9) t3 P(9) t3 I(9)}. 
The triple of sets (D(9), P(9), I(9)) is referred to as the equitability preference structure. 
3. PREL IMINARY RESULTS 
In this section we develop a matrix-based description of the ordering map O and the cumulative 
ordering map O and construct related cones. 
Let Ik, k -- 1 , . . . ,  m!, denote the matrices obtained by permuting columns of the m x m identity 
matrix 
1 0 ..- 0 
0 1 ...  0 
I1 -- 
0 0 ...  1 
REMARK 1. The following properties hold for a matrix Ik, k E {1,. . .  ,mI}: 
REMARK 2. Let y ~ R m and O(y) be the ordering map with a permutation ~. Then O(y) = I~y, 
where Ik is the identity matrix I1 with columns permuted according to T. 
DEFINITION 6. The set Si defined as 
s ,  = {v e R : ( I i v ) l  > (x v)2 >. . .  > 
where (Iiy)j is the jth component of the vector Iiy, is called sector {. 
REMARK 3. Let y E R m. Then I iy E $1 iff y E S~. 
PROPOSITION 2. A sector is a convex cone. 
PROOF. Let y E Si and a > 0. We have that (I iy)l >_ (Iiy)2 -> "'" -> (I iy)m and also I i (ay) = 
al i (y),  { -- 1 , . . . ,  m. We obtain a(I iy)x >_ a(Iiy)2 >_... >_ a(Iiv),~ so that ay  E Si, which proves 
that Si is a cone. 
Let yl ,y2 E Si. Clearly, I iy 1 + I iy 2 = I i(y 1 + y2). Since (I iyk)j  >_ (I iyk)j+l for all 5 = 
1 , . . . ,  m-  1 and k = 1, 2, we have (I i(y 1 +y2)) j  _> ( i i (yl  +y2)) j+ 1 for all j = 1 , . . . ,  m-  1. Thus 
yl + y2 6 Si proving that Si is a convex cone. ' | 
REMARK 4. A sector is not pointed. 
m I PROPOSITION 3. [']i'"l Si  ~- l, where l = {y 6 Rm : Yl = Y2 . . . . .  Ym} and is referred to as the 
equity line. 
m I m!  PROOF. It is clear that l C [']i--"l Si. Assume that I # [')('1 Si. Then, there exists a vector 
y 6 R m s.t. y E [']i'--'l Si with two different components yp # yq. Consider the matrix Is 
m! obtained by permuting columns p and q in I1. Since y 6 N i" l  Si we have y 6 S1, or equivalently 
YÀ >- Y2 >_ ""  >_ Ym, and y 6 $8, or equivalently l > Y2 -> "" "yp-1 >_ Yq >- Yp+l >_ "'" >_ Yq-À >__ 
Yp > yq+l > "-" > ym, which yields yp = yp+l . . . .  yq-1 = Yq contradicting the assumption. | 
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PROPOSITION 4. For any two sectors, Si and Sj in ~m, their intersection defined as Sii := 
S iAS  j _ {y • ~m:  (// _ / j )y  ---- 0} iS not empty. 
PROOF. Clearly, by Proposition 3, S~j # ~3. Consider y • Si [7 Sj. Then by Remark 3, I~y • $1 
and I jy • S1, which yields Iiy = ljy. | 
Let A1 denote the m x m lower triangular matrix of the form 
1 0 0 . . .  0 
1 1 0 . . .  0 
1 1 1 . . .  1 
and Ak, k ---- 1 , . . . ,  m!, denote the cumulative ordering matrices obtained by permuting columns 
of A1. Note that A k ---- Al Ik. 
REMARK 5. Let y • Sk. Then ~)(y) = A10(y) = Al Iky = Aky. 
DEFINITION 7. A permutation cone, Dk • ]~m, is defined as a pointed convex cone of the form 
Dk = {d • R m : Akd > 0}, where Ak := Al Ik.  
PROPOSITION 5. The following properties hold for permutation cones: 
1. Dk = I~D1, 
2. D~ = I [  Ik Dk. 
PROOF.  
1. Let d • D1, then equivalently, Al I ld  > 0 or Aid > 0. Consider the direction I [d  and 
calculate Ak(I~d) = Al Ik I [d  = Aid  > 0, which yields I [d•  Ok and proves the result. 
2. Similarly, let d • Dk, then equivalently, Akd > 0 or Al Ikd > O. Consider the direc- 
tion I~Ikd and calculate As(1,T/kd) = Al Is I~Ikd = A l Ikd = Akd > O, which yields 
I~Ikd • D~ and proves the result. | 
LEMMA 1. A point y • ~m is in a sector Sk if and only if Aky > Apy for all p = 1, . . . ,  m!. 
PROOF. Let y • Sk or by definition, (Iky)l _> (Iky)2 > "'" -> (Iky)m. Calculating the compo- 
nents of Aky = Al Iky we obtain 
(Aky) l  = (A l I ky ) l  = ( Iky ) l  > ( Ipy) l  = (A l Ipy ) l  = 
(Aky)2 = (Allky)2 = (Iky)l + (Iky)2 >_ (Ipy)l + (IpY)2 = (AiIpY)2 -~  (ApY)2, 
m m 
i= l  i= l  
where the inequalities above result from the definition of Sk and are equivalent o the desired 
vector inequality 
Aky > Apy, for all p = 1, . . .  ,m!. | 
REMARK 6. Let y e ]~m. If y C Sk and y ~ Sr then Aky > A~y. 
COROLLARY 1. Let d E Dk. H there exists y • Sk such that y + d • Sp, for some p • {1, . . . ,  m!}, 
then d • Dp. 
PROOF. Let y + d • Sp. Then by Lemma 1, Ap(y + d) > Ak(y + d) or Apy + Apd > Aky + Akd. 
Since d • Dk we have Akd > 0, and since y • Sk we have Aky > Apy. The three last inequalities 
imply Apd >_/kkd ~ O, which yields d • Dp. | 
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4. PREFERENCE STRUCTURE OF  EQUITABIL ITY  
In this section, we relate the preliminary results with the concept of equitability. We first 
examine properties of two outcomes located in the same sector and in two different sectors. 
PROPOSITION 6. Let yl and y2 be points in a sector Sk. If yl <= y2 then yl ~e y2. 
PROOf. Let yl,y2 E Sk and yl < y2. Then also Iky 1 <= Iky 2, and by Remark 2, O(y 1) -< O(y2), 
which by Proposition 1 yields ~(yl) _< ~)(y2) and yl ~-e y2. | 
COROLLARY 2. Let yk and yJ be points in sectors Sk and Sj, respectively, where k # j. I /  
Iky k <= Ijy j then yk ~--e YJ. 
PROPOSITION 7. Let yl and y2 be points in a sector Sk and Dk be the related permutation cone. 
Then yl ~-e y2 if[ y2 _ yl E Dk. 
PROOF. Using Proposition 1 and Remark 5, we obtain 
yl ---e y2 Prop~on 1Al lky 1 <= /k l /ky 2 (=~ A1/k (y2 _ yl) => 0 ¢=~ y2 _ yl E Dk. | 
PROPOSITION 8. Let yk and yJ be points in sectors Sk and Si, respectively, where k ~ j. Then 
the following statements are equivalent: 
1. yk ~-e (~-e)Y j,
2. Aky k <= (~)Ajy j, 
3. IjyJ - Iky k • 91(91 \ {0}), 
4. Iky k ~ (~e)IiyJ ,
5. yJ • I~Ik(y k + Ok) (I~Ik(y k + Ok \ {0})), 
6. yk • I f£(yJ  - ok) (I Ik(yJ - (Ok \ {0}))). 
PROOF. Since yk • Sk and yJ • Sj, by Proposition 1 and Remark 5 we obtain 
yk ~_ yj ~ Allkyk <= Al l jy j ,  
which is equivalent to (2) above and, by Definition 7, to (3) above. Additionally, 
Al Iky k <= Al I jy  j tee Al I l Iky k ~ A l I l I j y  j. 
Since Iky k, IiyJ • $1 we obtain (4) 
a le  (I y < a lo  (hy j) ** o (Iky < ( I j )  k IjyJ. 
Also (3,) is equivalent to 
(3) ¢=~ 3d • 91 s.t. I jy j = Iky k + d ¢=~ yJ • I~Iky k + I~D1 <=~ yJ • I~Ik (yk -F Dk) , 
where the last equivalence results from Proposition 5. Similarly we obtain the equivalence 
with (6). | 
PROPOSITION 9. Let Sk be a sector and Ok the related permutation cone. If  y • Sk and d • Dk, 
d ~ O then y + d -% y. 
PROOF. One of the following two cases may occur. 
1. If y + d • S~, then by Proposition 7, y + d -~ y. 
2. If y + d ¢ Sk then there exists a sector Sp, p ¢ k such that y + d • Sp. Then by Lemma 1 
we have Ap(y + d) >= A~(y + d). Since d • Dk, we also have Akd ->_ 0. We obtain 
/kp(y ~c d) >= Aky + Akd >_ A~y, 
and by Remark 5, O(y + d) _> ~)(y), which in turn gives y + d -~e Y. | 
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COROLLARY 3. Let be y • Sk, d • Dk \ {0}, and y + d E Sp, then Ip(y + d) - Iky • D1 \ {0}. 
PROOF. Immediate from Proposition 9. I 
Note that the conclusion of Corollary 3 is equivalent to all other statements in Proposition 8. 
Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollary 4 constitute the main results of this section. They provide a 
complete description of the equitability preference structure. 
THEOREM 1. Let be 9 • Sk. The set D(9) • ~m o£ points equitably dominated by 9 is given by 
m! 
n(9) = U I~Ik(9 + nk \ {0}). 
p=l  
PROOF. Recall that by definition, D(9) := {y e R ~ : y -% 9}. First assume that y e D(9). Let 
y C Sp for some p E {1,. . . ,  m!}. Due to Proposition 8, 
Y -% 9 ¢=> Y e I~Ik(9 + Ok \ {0}). 
Since p is arbitrary, we establish 
rM 
{y • v a} c_ [.J I [h  (a + Dk \ {0}). 
p=l  
m I To complete the proof, assume that y • Up'--" 1I~h  (y + Dk \ {0}). Then y • ITph (Y + Dk \ {0}) 
for some p • {1,... ,m!}. Due to Proposition 5, we obtain y • I~Ik9 + Dp \ {0} which implies 
that there exists d • Dp\{0} such that y = ITvIk9+d. By Definition 7, we get hp(y--Ipq-/kg) >_ 0, 
which becomes Avy -- Ak 9 > 0. Then, by Proposition 8 we have y -% Y. I 
THEOREM 2. Let be 9 • Sk. The set P(Y) • Rm o£points equitably preferred to 9 is given by 
rn! 
P(Y) = ~ I~Ik (Y - (Ok \ {0})). 
p=l 
PROOF. Recall that by definition, P(Y) = {Y e R m : y ~-e 9}. First assume that y e P(Y). Let 
y E Sq for some q C {1,. . . ,m!}. 
Consider vectors defined as follows: 
and calculate 
dp := I~Ik9 - y, Vp = 1, . . . ,  rn!, 
Apdp = ApITp lk9 -- Apy 
= Ak9 -- Apy 
Lemma 1 
>: AkY  -- Aqy 
Proposition 8 
> 0, 
which yields dp E Dp for all p = 1, . . . ,  m!, where by Proposition 5, Dp = ITIkDk. Thus, for all 
p = 1, . . . ,  m! we have 
y = ITSk9 - dp 
or equivalently 
y e I~Ik (9 - nk) ,  
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and since dp ~ 0 
Therefore 
To complete the proof, 
{1 . . . .  , m!} we have 
y • (9 - \ {0}). 
m! 
y • ~ fp Ik  (Y-- Dk \ {0}). 
p=l  
?T1, I assume that y • ~lp"l I~Ik(9  -- (Ok \ {0})). 
Y • ITpIk (Y - (Dk \ {0})) Prop~on 5 Y • ~TpZk9 __ DB \ {0} 
Then for every p • 
3dp • Dp \ {0} s.t. y = ITIk9 - dp 
dp = I~ Ik9  - y • Dp \ {0}. 
By Definition 7 we obtain 
y) >0,  
which using Remarks 5 and 1 becomes 
Ak9 -- Apy >_ O 
and by Proposition 8 yields 
Y ~-e 9. | 
PROPOSITION 10. P(~) is a convex set. 
PROOF. Let Y, Y e P(~) and assume that 9 • Sk, ~ • Sp, and ~ • Sq where k,p,q • {1,... ,m!}. 
We show that ay + (1 - a)~ • P(Y) for all a • (0, 1). 
Assume that for an arbitrary a • (0, 1), aS + (1 - a)~ • S~ for some r • {1,. . . ,  m!}. Calculate 
+ (1 - + A (1 - 
= aA~ + (1 - a)A~ 
Lemraa 1 
<--_ sap9  + (1 - a)Aq~. 
Since $ ~-~ 9 and ~ ~-~ Y, by Proposition 8 we get Ap$ < Ak9 and Aq~ _< Akg, respectively. 
Then we continue 
oLApy + (1 -- o~)Aq~ <_ o~Ak9 + (1 -- a )Ak~ 
= Ak~.  
In summary, A , (ay  + (1 -- ~)~) _< Ak9 which, by Proposition 8, is equivalent to (~y + (1 - (~)~ C 
P(9). 
COROLLARY 4. Let be 9 E Sk. The set I(9) C ]~m of points equitably indifferent o 9 is given by 
I(9) = {y C ~m : y = I ; I k~ for some p ---- 1 , . . . ,m!} .  
We end this section with some results on outcomes obtained through the application of the 
principle of transfers. 
DEFINITION 8. Let yl and y2 be in ~m. We say that y2 has been obtained from yl using 
the principle of transfers a finite number of times /f there exist a finite sequence of vectors 
yl0 = yl, y11,... ,yl(t-1), ylt = y2 such that ylk = ylk-1 _ zkei, + ~kei,, , 0 < sk < yk-1 _ yik,21 
for k = 1,2, . . . , t .  
Let PT(9)  denote the set of all points generated using the principle of transfers a finite number 
of times starting with ~. The following proposition will be used in the next section. 
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PROPOSITION 11. Let yl and y2 be in ]~'~. If y I ~-e y2 and ~.~(yl) = ~m(y2) then yl can be 
obtained from y2 using the principle of transfers a finite number of times. 
PROOF. Without loss of generality and due to impartiality, assume that yl, y2 6 $1, i.e., y~ >_ 
y~ _>... >_ y~ and y~ _> y2 >_... _> y2. If yl ___~ y2 then y~ _< yl 2. Using the principle of transfers 
rn 1 m 2 92  for each component y2 of y2 such that y2 > y~, and applying ~¢=1 Yi -- ~=1 Yi, we can find 
for which 
= y l  
i= l , . . . ,m 
Without loss of generality assume now that 92 6 $1. Then using the principle of transfers we 
obtain 
yi ~_ 92, (1) 
m m 
i=i i=1  
Due to (1)-(4), again using the principle of transfers for each component 92 of 92, where 92 > yl 
and k >_ 2, we can get 92 6 $1 such that 
yl >-e ~2, 
= 
= 
m m 
i= l  i= l  
Note that first two components of yl and ~2 are the same. Repeating the same procedure a finite 
number of times we construct 92 such that 92 = yl. | 
Based on Definitions 2 and 8 we also obtain the following result. 
PROPOSITION 12. Let 9 E ~m. Then PT(9 ) C P(Y). 
5. GENERATING EQUITABLY  EFF IC IENT SOLUTIONS 
Consider the following multiobjective program (MOP): 
min f(x) = [fl(x), f2(x) . . . .  ,fro(x)], 
s.t. x ~ X _c ~,  (5) 
where f is a vector-valued function and f~, i = 1, . . . ,  m, are real-valued functions. Consider two 
types of efficiency for this MOP, Pareto efficiency and equitable fficiency. We say that a feasible 
solution x is Pareto efficient for the MOP if there does not exist x' 6 X such that f(x') ~_ f(x). 
We say that a feasible solution x is equitably efficient for the MOP if there does not exist x' 6 X 
such that f(x') >-~ f(x). The outcome y -- f(x) of a (Pareto or equitably) efficient solution x is 
referred to as (Pareto or equitably) nondominated. 
Theorem 3 generalizes the analogous result developed for linear MOPs in [9]. 
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THEOREM 3. Let x E X and y = f (x) .  I f  y is an equitably nondominated outcome for the MOP 
then it is also Pareto nondominated for this problem. 
PROOF. Recall that y - ~ is the set of points preferred to y with respect o Pareto efficiency. 
Note that R~= C Dp, Yp  = 1 , . . . ,m! .  Hence, y - ~_  C P(y).  Thus, the set of all equitably 
nondominated outcomes is contained in the set of all Pareto nondominated outcomes. | 
Theorem 3 motivates the development of a two-step method for finding equitably efficient 
solutions in the sense that a suitably found Pareto efficient solution of the MOP may lead to an 
equitably efficient solution. Consider first the following s-constrained scalarization of the MOP 
in which the objective functions are added but also individually bounded from above by E. 
m 
min E l i (x ) '  
i=1  
s.t. f i (x) <_ s, 
x~X C_R "~. 
for all i = 1 , . . . ,m,  
(6)  
An optimal solution of problem (6) is a Pareto efficient solution of the MOP [13]. Let z~ 
denote the optimal objective value of problem (6) and consider another single-objective program 
in which the Euclidean norm of the outcome vector is minimized subject to the feasibility and 
optimality of problem (6). 
min 
s.t. 
IL [ f l  (x ) ,  • • •,  fm li,  
= 
(7) 
f i (x) <_ ~, for all i = 1, . . . ,  k, 
xEX C_R n. 
THEOREM 4. Let x* 6 X .  I f  x* is an optimal solution for problem (7) then it is an equitably 
efficient; solution for the MOP (5). 
PROOF. Let x* be an optimal solution for (7). By contradiction assume that x* is not an 
equitably efficient solution for the MOP (5), i.e., there exists 2 E X such that f(2) = ~ ~-e Y* = 
f (x*).  Using Proposition 1 we have 
~ Y ~ @(~) ~ @(y*). 
From the first component of this vector inequality we get 
max Yi< max y*<s ,  
i~ l , . . . ,m - -  i= l , . . . ,m - -  
where the second inequality above holds since x* is feasible for problem (7). From the last 
component of the same vector inequality we obtain 
m 
fi( ) < = 
i~1  i : l  
However, since z~ is the optimal value of problem (6), there must be ~-]~i~l fi(2) = ze, which 
makes ~ feasible for problem (7), and also ~m(~) = 0,~(y*). Using now Proposition 11, we obtain 
that ~ can be obtained from y* using the principle of transfers a finite number of times. Therefore 
IlYll < [lY* ]1, which contradicts the assumption that x* is an optimal solution for problem (7). | 
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COROLLARY 5. I[ X* is an optimal solution for problem (6) with y* = f(x*)  such that y{ = y~ = 
. . . .  y*,  then it is an equitable mcient solution to the MOP (5). 
PROOF. Under the given assumptions, x* is also an optimal solution for problem (7), and by 
Theorem 4, is equitably efficient for the MOP. | 
Problems (6) and (7) constitute a two-step method for finding equitably efficient solutions 
of the MOP. The Pareto nondominated outcome produced by problem (6) leads to an equitably 
nondominated outcome of the MOP. Note that problems (6) and (7) are single objective nonlinear 
programs that can be solved using conventional optimization methods. 
6. CONCLUSION 
While equitability has not been given much attention in the mathematical programming litera- 
ture, with this article, its theory and methodology have been advanced. The complete preference 
structure of equitability is derived and a scalarization approach to finding equitably efficient 
solutions of general multiple objective programs is proposed. 
Further studies may go in the direction of applied research, in particular, applications of 
equitability in engineering design. 
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